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MONEY IN POLITICS
MR. FAY: It is appropriate that we're dealing with the general
topic of election finance in 1983. For the past two or three years
neither the Congress nor the State Legislature has been particularly active in this area. This year, however, it appears that committees from
both of these bodies have been fairly active, and it is entirely possible
that we may have some major new legislation emanating either from
the Congress or from the State legislature, or perhaps both, this year.
With that introduction, I will turn things over first to Professor
Alexander and we'll proceed alphabetically.
Herb?
MR. ALEXANDER: May I say that as a political scientist and the
only non-lawyer on the panel, I am very pleased to be here. While I
appreciate the introduction which Jim Fay gave me, I want to add that
I'm also currently co-authoring a book with Erica Jong, entitled "Fear
of Filing."
I think the 1980 elections effectively killed election reform. It had
been comatose somewhat before, but in any case, at the federal level
there is little doubt that there has now set in an era of counter-reform.
From a point of view of political science, the reforms of the 1970's were
very interesting. There were more political reforms in that decade than
there had been since the first decade of the twentieth century. Significant steps were taken with the enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), its various amendments in 1974, 1976 and 1979,
and with the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1971 which brought the
first public funding for presidential elections. Disclosure, which I
think, is, has been, and will remain the keystone of regulation with
respect to this subject, was improved. Contribution limits which, as I'll
suggest shortly, have caused some havoc, were introduced. Expenditure limits were also introduced, but the Supreme Court found reason
to accept them as constitutional only when provided as a condition of
acceptance of public funding. Administrative and enforcement agencies such as the Federal Election Commission, which is similar to the
Fair Political Practices Commission here in the state, were established.
The later 1970's saw the advent of counter-reform. This was
largely a reaction to some of the steps that were taken to toughen
FECA, particularly through the 1974 amendments. One avenue taken
by the counter-reform movement was to cut back on disclosure to the
extent possible, to minimize the burdens that disclosure imposed. This
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flew in the face of additional efforts by reformers seeking both to extend public funding beyond the presidential races to those for Senate
and House seats, and to further restrict political action committees at
the federal level.
What we have now at the federal level, I think, is a jerry-built
system and I'm not referring to the former California governor. I refer
to it as a jerry-built system because I don't think anyone would consciously have designed it. It's based on legislation, with elements of
incumbent self-protection, and on the results of litigation, mainly
Supreme Court rulings, which are not wholly consistent and which
have caused real problems in administration and enforcement of the
law. I'd like to suggest, without recounting the important case of Buckley v. Valeo, which is the basic case in the area of election reform and
which is best left to the lawyers, that there can be distilled from the
Supreme Court decisions four general principles which can serve as a
basis for the discussion that will follow. The general principles which I
have derived from looking at the law as defined by the Court are these:
One. Reform which the Court considers as seeking to prevent
corruption or the appearance of corruption may represent an interest
compelling enough to justify a marginal infringement of free speech.
Two. Reform which primarily seeks to equalize campaign resources is generally not construed as presenting an interest compelling
enough to infringe free speech rights. However, campaign expenditure
limitations can be linked to acceptance of optional public funding.
Three. Political messages in and of themselves are highly valued
and protected in a democratic polity. Regulations which restrict these
messages infringe upon society in general and are subject to the utmost
scrutiny under the law. The right to hear messages of a political nature, and in turn to have one's messages heard, are separate First
Amendment rights in addition to the right to speak. I would add that
the courts have suggested that important consideration be given to the
right of association under the First Amendment.
Four. Under the association provision of the First Amendment,
the speech of groups may be no more restricted than that of individuals
unless preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption is the primary basis for such a restriction.
My view, perhaps as distinct from what the courts may ultimately
say, is that the political action committee (PACs) should not be subjected to more regulation than they already are. At the federal level,
PACs are already subject to contribution limits, just like those imposed
on individuals. There are, of course, proposals to further restrict PACs
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mainly by reducing the amount which they may contribute, but also by
introducing a different level of restriction, one that would impose an
aggregate limit on the amounts that candidates can accept. This has
not been tested in the courts because it's not directly a contribution
limit and it's not directly an expenditure limit. I would suggest that in
an age in which there are high political costs, political money is necessary and that to further restrict sources of funding would be undesirable. From a constitutional point of view, I perceive problems in the
notion of aggregate limitation on the amount that candidates could accept because they would be forced to pick and choose among those who
might wish to give to the campaign. Assuming that the candidate
wants to accept more than the aggregate or that the candidate wants to
accept money from groups which might be unable to give because the
aggregate has been reached, I think that such a restriction would have
an undesirable impact on political campaigns.
In conclusion, my preference in dealing with PACs is to strengthen
the parties rather than attempt to weaken the PACs. As a political scientist I've seen the problems which political parties have had in the
modern era. I've also seen the impact that federal and state election
laws have had on the parties. I personally think there are ways in
which election laws can be changed to enhance, rather than diminish,
the role of the party. The election reform laws of the 1970's may have
benefitted parties to some extent. But I do believe, for example, that
the limitations on party giving to candidates are untenable in a time
when there are no aggregate limits on the amounts that PACs can give.
California is about the only state - and the 1982 election showed this
in which the Republican Party nationally was able to give more
money to a candidate for federal office, Pete Wilson, than he received
from PACs. In almost every other state, because of the smaller population on which the party limits are based, the aggregate amounts that
PAC's give in marginal campaigns was higher than the amounts the
parties give. I think that the preferential position which PACs have
thus obtained is unfortunate.
I think with those remarks I'll cease and desist because I've probably gone over my time. In any case, these are a political scientist's view
of this subject at the present time.
MR. FAY: Thank you, Herb.
Peter?
MR. BAGATELOS: Ladies and gentlemen, Senator Lockyer and
his colleagues are the ones that pass these laws. The learned professors
on the panel are the ones that study them and their impacts. Mr. Prim
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and Mr. Stem, on my right, are the ones that interpret the laws and
enforce them. My job is to advise the people that have to comply with
them, and that's the hardest part, I think. At the compliance level
we're dealing with people that don't understand these laws. In most
cases they have never heard of them before. Volunteer treasurers and
others that keep the records have to fill out reports and meet deadlines
all the time. They have to meet restrictions for contributions, scrutinizing every check that comes in, for example, on the federal level, to
make sure that they don't get any contributions from corporations, foreign nationals, labor unions, or other prohibited sources. From the
vantage point of someone that has to render compliance advice, there
should be less regulation, not more.
I approached today's panel discussion by trying to identify the
goals of the political system, and I came up with four. The first one is
to assure fair access of candidates to office. The second is to eliminate
undue influence on the decisions of officeholders, and that can take the
form of money or other influence. The third is to promote citizen participation through voting, free speech, association, and involvement in
the legislative process. The last, and probably the most important, is to
instill voter confidence in the system.
When we talk about reform in this area, my attitude is that there
should be reform only if it is needed. Is the need actual or is it just a
perceived need? Often there's a knee-jerk reaction by people who say,
"Oh, we have a problem. The PACs are too powerful in this country.
We've got to limit their authority and their strength. Let's limit the
amount that they can give." That PACs are too powerful may or may
not be true. Twenty-seven percent of the money in the last congressional cycle came from PACs, leaving seventy-three percent to come
from other sources. That further restrictions should be imposed is certainly open to question.
How then, do we advance the four goals? To assure that candidates have fair access to the political arena, it's been proposed that we
reduce the cost of elections or that we publicly subsidize them. Well,
whenever you pass a new law, you might solve a problem, but you also
might create a new one. As I see it, if you reduce the expenditure limitations - and I'm not sure that that can be done under the Buckley v.
Valeo decision unless there are public funds involved in that process then it may have the effect of perpetuating the power of the majority
party in the legislature. That party would control the expenditure
levels. It could assure that only incumbents get elected, because the
people that are new, the outsiders that want access to the process, may
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not be able to spend enough money to get their name and their message
across. That's a problem that has to be considered. Furthermore, I
don't think that there's public support for more stringent expenditure
limitations, or even for public financing in this country. I understand
that only approximately twenty-five percent of the people that file tax
returns check off the $1 box to support presidential elections. That's
hardly an overwhelming majority.
On the second point of eliminating undue influence, it's been proposed that, as in the federal system, we place a thousand dollar limit on
contributions by individuals to candidates for office. However, I don't
think that limitations are as desirable as disclosure. As Professor Alexander stated, disclosure is the key to this whole area of campaign finance reform. Let me use the following example to show why I like
disclosure. When a thief breaks into a house he does his business and
escapes, and nobody knows about it. But if people are looking in the
window of the house and see him doing that, he's not going to carry on
those deceitful activities. It's the same thing in the campaign finance
arena. If you have laws requiring full disclosure and good enforcement
to assure that those laws are obeyed, people can be assured of a candidate's integrity because there's less likelihood that you're gong to have
clandestine votes or money under the table and that kind of thing. I
also wonder about the effectiveness of restrictions on contributions to
candidates, since they don't address other ways by which influence can
be obtained such as the giving of honoraria. You can have an officeholder come and speak to your group and pay him money for it, and
certainly that's a means of obtaining influence over that person. Home
hospitality is another manner. There's another interesting case that
I've always wondered about. One person that doesn't have to spend a
nickel on a campaign and yet could have the most amount of influence
with a candidate is the finance chairman of the candidate's campaign
committee, the person that has to go out and raise the bucks. He is
more valuable to that candidate than any other person, perhaps, and
perhaps exerts the most amount of influence. Yet there's no law in
effect governing that relationship.
As to the third goal of promoting citizen participation by voting,
free speech, association and so forth, it's my view that we have to allow
unlimited spending. If we want to assure maximum participation by
large groups as well as small groups, we've got to give all of them access to the system. After all, free speech costs money. It costs money to
send out mailers. The larger the jurisdiction, the more people you have
to reach, the more money it takes. Imposing restrictions just limits the
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ability of the candidates to raise that money and get their message
across. Despite what others may say, it just isn't true that money can
buy elections. One candidate spent a million dollars in the forty-third
congressional district and still came in third.
Lastly, to instill voter confidence, as Professor Alexander said,
you've got to avoid the appearance of corruption in the system. I don't
think the limitations necessarily do that because corruption is still possible. I believe in disclosure, and where there's full and adequate disclosure and good enforcement of disclosure laws, I think that sunshine
will prevail and people will be basically honest.
MR. FAY: Thank you, Peter.
Ed?
PROF. EPSTEIN: Thanks, Jim.
If media attention is any indicator of the importance of an issue,
then I think unquestionably the most important concern arising out of
the 1982 elections was the role of PACs. Scarcely a week passed in the
month or so before the election without a major story in Newsweek,
Business Week, and after the election, in New Yorker, about the role of
PACs. It's ironic because if this meeting were held ten years ago, PACs
would have been a non-subject on the agenda of campaign financing
since the PAC phenomenon, as we have to come to see it over the last
several years, is really a development of the period post 1974. Although the opening for PAC's was established in the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 and by a number of critical amendments added
by the 1974 act, it really wasn't until 1975 that political action committees became a serious force in politics.
Although Herb Alexander properly claims to be the only member
of this panel who is solely a political scientist, I think at least Jim Fay
and I, although we admit to taint by our legal degrees, also have a
strong background in political science. It's in that context that I'd like
to initiate my own remarks with regard to PACs and their role in the
political process and what, to me at least, are some of the issues which
they raise.
I go back to an old chestnut, an old favorite of people who look at
our constitutional order, and that's Federalist 10, because the difficulty
that Madison was attempting to address was the question of the dangers of faction to a new and fragile nation. The dilemma for Madison
and his fellow federalists was to create a governmental order which
would simultaneously facilitate the exercise of liberty and inhibit the
deleterious consequences of faction. They sought in the proposed constitution to control the effects of faction by establishing a republic
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wherein the greater number of citizens would delegate the functions of
government to a small number of citizens, their elected representatives,
who would refine and enlarge the presentation of public views. The
federalist dilemma of preserving and assuring the liberty of the citizenry while curing the mischiefs of faction has acquired a singularly
contemporary relevance to the system of financing federal election
campaigns which has emerged in the United States over the past decade. The Federal Election Act of 1971 and its amendments have focused attention on the ability of our political institutions to maximize
free political expression on the part of the citizenry, acting either individually or collectively, while minimizing the social divisiveness frequently attendant to the political activities of strident, particularistic
factions. This is not a new conundrum so far as American electoral
politics and American electoral law is concerned. For over a century
federal law has had the dual objective of protecting both our election
process and public officials from possible domination or corruption by
wealthy persons and organizations while safeguarding citizens' rights
of free speech and association. A perfect equilibrium between these
two goals has never been achieved in the electoral finance area of
course, just as a precise balance among competing interests has not
been realized in other sectors of the American political order. Indeed,
very realistically, an exact equilibrium is not truly possible in any case.
Perhaps no other aspect of American electoral politics has been more
reflective of this conundrum than that of the PAC phenomenon.
The data are known to most of you, and I'll just very briefly give
you some of the indicators of what has taken place here. As of the end
of 1982, there were nearly 3400 PACs registered with the Federal Election Commission, an increase of over five-and-a-half-fold from some
600 which existed on December 31, 1974. These PACs, to be sure, represent a vast array of interest groups and concerns within American
society, ranging from the American Feed Manufacturers Association,
the American Medical Association, Communication Workers of
America, the Wine Institute, Committee to Defeat Union Bosses, the
National Association of Retired Persons - truly a galaxy of concerns.
These PACs have increased the amount of money for which they are
accountable so far as the electoral process is concerned. In a matter of
just a few years, from 1976 to 1982 - four election cycles - they have
almost quadrupled themselves, up from some twenty-two and a half
million to some eighty-five and a half million dollars in 1982. More
importantly, from my perspective at least, the amount of money that
they represent in terms of candidates' receipts has increased quite sig-
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nificantly over the last several election cycles, from slightly less than
twenty percent in 1976 to -

and I have to disagree here -

upwards of

one third of what congressional candidates received in the 1982
campaign.
Now, we could go on with the data, but I don't feel the data is
really the most important thing here. It's a matter of the implications
of these proportions. We can argue the relationship between either
dollars contributed to an election campaign and the outcome of that
election campaign and the role that PACs have played in it and the
ultimate passage or defeat or implementation or non-implementation
of public policy. But I don't think anyone who has viewed the subject
would argue with the point that what has developed in the last halfdecade is an encouragement, an institutionalization, to some extent legitimated by the FECA, of a system of mutual dependency between
candidates and political action committees of a type that did not exist
heretofore. Business, labor, and other interest groups have always been
involved in the electoral process. But it's the institutionalization, it's
the development of a system of mutual dependency that has taken
place in the last number of years that seems to me exceed anything that
we've seen in the electoral process heretofore. I think PACs have their
place within limits so far as the electoral process is concerned. I do
think, however, that when they get to the point of representing close to
a third of the monies that candidates receive, they exceed those limits
and there's a need for constraint, for limitations on the total amount of
money which candidates can receive from PACs. However, and here I
agree a thousand percent with Herb Alexander, the problem with elections is not that too much money is being spent. I think it's a question
of from where the money comes. I would rather see some form of partial public financing and limitations put on the abilities of PACs to
become the determinative source, to extend the role that individuals
can play, to extend the role that parties can play, than to say that we
should spend less money on the electoral process.
MR. FAY: Thank you, Ed.
Ray?
PROF. FORRESTER: Well, I agree with the emphasis that Professor Epstein has given in his comments here. I certainly do think that
money can buy elections. If not, why is the chairman of the finance
committee so important, as we've just been told? Candidates can be
sold just as well as soap if you have enough money and enough know
how to handle the thing wisely and well. Madison Avenue has now
proven that to be the case. It first established with reference to soap
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and similar products that if you advertise it enough, you're going to sell
it. It seems to me from a pragmatic point of view, and it's been pretty
clearly established as far as candidates are concerned, that name recognition is the big thing. The unknown candidate has no chance. But,
unfortunately, a very poor candidate, if marketed properly and sufficiently, can win, as we've seen too many times in American politics. So
I think the problem is major, I think it's very pressing. I think all of the
facts that we read in the newspapers and have heard here today indicate that. I certainly think that PACs should be limited, contrary to the
comment that was made earlier. They are having, according to the reports that I read, an inordinate impact on the political process in this
country, and from a pragmatic point of view, it seems to me that we've
got to meet that problem.
Now as far as the Constitution is concerned, it has, in part been
made a base for the problem that we're in by the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. It's a rather bold and bald way to put it,
but that's my simple conclusion. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme
Court made it quite clear, number one, that it regards the spending of
money as speech, and, number two, that it is going to relate the spending of money in any amount to the First Amendment and make attempts to regulate it unconstitutional. They have in effect said that
making a contribution to a candidate in a federal election can be limited to one thousand dollars, despite the First Amendment, but that
limiting the amount of money spent independently of the candidate
would violate the First Amendment. Now, as pointed out by Mr. Justice White in his dissenting opinion in Buckley, that makes no sense,
because independent spending can be just as effective on behalf of a
candidate as contributions made directly to him, and there is no need
as far as the Constitution is concerned to make that distinction. It
opens the side door to accomplish by indirection what the statute is
trying to avoid directly. That is what Mr. Justice White says very
plainly, and I agree with him a hundred percent. Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun in their opinions agreed with Justice White that
the distinction between contributions and expenditures, quote, "will
not wash," as they put it, and I certainly agree with that. But they
conclude that the whole law should be held unconstitutional, that you
simply can't control or equalize the spending of money in a political
campaign.
Now the truth of the matter is that this is really the work of the
Court; it's not the work of the First Amendment. The Court itself
frankly admits that freedom of speech, even in the form of spending
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money, is not absolute. Freedom of speech can be curtailed if you can
show a compelling governmental interest. In this case I think, along
with Justice White, that there is a compelling governmental interest.
The Court admits that there's a compelling governmental interest concerning contributions. It says that limits are necessary in order to avoid
corruption. Well, if there is a compelling governmental interest in connection with contributions, then certainly the Court, if it wished, could
have found a compelling governmental interest in connection with independent expenditures. So the solution really, fundamentally, at least
on the constitutional level, is to get Buckley v. Valeo overruled. That
may take a little doing. But we've had a good deal of pressure in that
direction already. Judge Skelly Wright and some other prominent federal judges have been bold enough to take their case to the people.
They were overruled, by Buckley v. Valeo, and I think in time that
they're going to gain enough influence, they and their cohorts, to get
the Supreme Court to change this unfortunate decision.
Of course, there are many aspects of this thing. I'm not going to
take any more time at this point.
MR. FAY: Thank you, Professor Forrester.
Bill Lockyer is next. I should mention that as chairman of the
Senate Elections and Reapportionment Committee, Senator Lockyer
will clearly be a decisive voice in any political changes in election laws
that emerge in the legislature this year.
SEN. LOCKYER: It's very nice to have a chance to talk about
elections and not reapportionment, which seems to be the subject of
everyone's concerns just now.
I think probably the most constructive thing for me to do would be
to start with some of the anxieties, concerns and perspectives of an
elected official and policymaker as it relates to this discussion, and then
maybe briefly sketch some of the current thinking with respect to legislation that may move along in the next eighteen months in Sacramento.
First, though I'm sure I would be described as a liberal, I must
confess to some general skepticism about reform. It doesn't take a long
time to become skeptical in government when you repeatedly fix something and find out that's it worse after having gone through that exercise than it was before. I wonder, with respect to public financing of
campaigns, if the fact that the campaign of Ronald Reagan - who is,
at least for me, the epitome of a captive of the wealthy and special
interests in our society - is publicly financed or not has any impact at
all on his policy as President. Questions like that contribute more to
my skepticism. Secondly, all of us in the profession are usually clever
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enough to figure out ways to circumvent these laws. The disclosure
requirements that we all seem to think are good obviously only(BELL)
SPEAKER: It's a form of disclosure.
SEN. LOCKYER: Do they still have bells here?
SPEAKER: It's time to vote.
SEN. LOCKYER: The disclosure laws only work with those who
are willing to make the disclosure in the first place. I don't know many
that are likely to take cash or something like that, but the possibility's
there, and of course those contributions aren't being disclosed. Also,
they don't seem to advertise the fact that they do that sort of thing. But
that's only one example. There are many, many more situations in
which well intended reforms just don't work. One reform implemented
in Sacramento last year was a law that you couldn't take campaign
contributions in the capitol. So now you regularly see people walk out
to the sidewalk or go elsewhere to take contributions. Frankly, it eats
into your work time to have to take these little strolls which don't further reform, but now that's the law.
I am also of the general view that the effect of our economic and
social structure is so pervasive that it is somewhat naive to think that
you can construct a political system that won't be influenced by the fact
that this is a capitalist society in which certain people have an extraordinary amount of wealth. No matter what we do, these people are
going to figure out a way to see that this wealth impacts political
decisions.
There are some half a dozen or so specific questions that I have
about the potential impact of the various systems that have been suggested for reforming campaign funding. They usually involve the
things you've heard - expenditure limits, contribution limits, various
thresholds at which public financing is mixed in with private funds and
so on. My own experience has been that small contributors try to influence me about policy matters more than large contributors. I don't
know why that is exactly, but it seems that local people who contribute
a hundred dollars or a couple hundred dollars expect more in the way
of impact on public policy than, say, the United Farm Workers who, I
think, gave me forty or fifty thousand dollars last year. I had an expensive race, spent a half a million dollars of my friends' money, and was
my own finance chairman. I hope people will realize the extent of the
demands placed on our time and not create a system that makes us
spend even more time raising money from lots of small contributors.
I'm not sure that's really a healthy reform. I'm also concerned about
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the class bias of the people that would be relied upon. If it is limited to
the upper middle class folks like me that subscribe to KQED and who
have a particular slant on public policy, it may not be desirable to have
them be the backbone of campaign finance. Lots of folks get left out of
their world view.
Most systems of public finance also have a contradictory impact
that troubles me. Our insistence on encouraging more small contributions usually means ideological money. People that write a check for a
hundred dollars are almost always folks who are motivated by very
strongly held principles, they're usually very left or very right, and so
this insistence means strengthening those particular forces in our political system. It's not that they aren't already there, its just that we're
perhaps making them more significant. There is yet another problem
with public financing of campaigns. Some legislative districts are really
non-competitive. Once you've gotten there and gotten established in
perhaps three fourths of the district, you usually only have token opposition. There may be a fierce fight that goes on in the remaining one
fourth, but normally incumbents are not turned out. Most public financing schemes will result in every incumbent having a much more
significant opponent than they have had in the past. That usually
means that those folks who felt pretty comfortable and safe and able to
take positions that were perhaps more liberal or conservative than their
constituency will feel the pressure from a reasonably well-financed opponent to move to the middle, and I think you will probably find most
politicians under a public finance system more cautious, more centrist,
and yet relying more on ideological money to put their campaign together. It's an interesting contradiction. It's one we have right now. I
have heard people argue to the contrary that public financing just locks
incumbents in and challengers need a lot of money in order to ever
defeat them. While that is certainly true looking at many elections, my
suspicion is that if virtually all challengers are better financed than they
currently are, it will provide for some upsets because they will at least
be able to get enough money going to raise issues and do adequate
mailings and things of that sort.
Many are also unhappy with the prospect of having to finance
flakes. There are some people that run every year in our area who are
just crazy. I hope that the thresholds will be properly designed so that
any credible candidate meeting some test that doesn't improperly deny
access will be funded while excluding lawyers who just want to advertise their practice and other folks who are just weird.

478

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 10:463

As for the legislative agenda, we have had a task force that represents the principals in the Republican and Democratic caucuses who
have some campaign expertise sitting down on a weekly basis for the
last three months trying to develop campaign finance reform bills for
which we might be able to get some substantial consensus in Sacramento. It's kind of a SALT talks situation where you just keep going
down the list and see what you wind up with, and what we've wound
up with so far are some expenditure limits, which, although they are
very high, at least try to put some constraint on the almost doubling of
expenditures with each election cycle. We're trying to hold it down to
about two dollars a voter, so that for a state senate seat, which is a little
larger than a congressional district, the spending limit would be about
$600,000. It's still a lot of money,
We're also trying to come up with contribution limits that relate to
the public financing and how much it matches, so that small amounts
of money match better than large amounts of money. While candidates can accept any amount - we're not trying to say someone can't
contribute a large amount if they wish to - public financing will match
up to a thousand dollars. It would be three to one for small checks, and
then two to one, and then one to one when you get up to a grand. All
those numbers are fairly flexible; we're now just trying to find out
where the votes are with the notion.
We're hoping to deal with the Buckley problem of expenditure
limits by a tax, basically, that would be a mandatory recontribution
once you get above the $600,000 limit. A candidate could spend above
the limit, whether they were taking public funds or not; but for every
dollar they spend above it, they would have to put a dollar back into
the fund that finances these campaigns. We're hoping that would be a
serious disincentive to excessive spending.
There are questions about how to finance the fund that are persistent: whether there should be a vote of the people or not, to institute
this system; whether there should be ethics provisions that go with it.
There are many that want to try to include fair campaign provisions so
that's part of some plans. We also have to consider whether primaries,
or only general elections, will be included and whether it's statewide
elections or merely legislative ones. These seem to be the debates that
we're in the midst of. I think something will happen prior to the 1986
elections, that is, a two year effort to get a law changed to bring expenditures down some, and then a waiting period before it gets fully
implemented.
Thank you very much.
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MR. FAY: Thank you, Bill.
Ted?
MR. PRIM: First of all, I'd like to say that Chairman Dan Stanford of the Fair Political Practices Commission sends his regrets that he
was unable to attend today. He has big shoes so he has sent both Bob
Stem, the general counsel for the agency, and me along. I'll take his
left shoe and I'll leave Bob his right shoe in a minute, and we'll do the
best we can.
Back when Watergate occurred there was a tremendous amount of
activity and interest in political reform, and out of that time period
came a number of political reform statutes throughout the nation, including the federal law. I don't know whether we have the same kind
of ferment going on now or not, but one thing that seems clear is that
problems with the political system and problems involving campaign
finance seem to be more on the minds of state legislators this year than
they have been in past years. There is a tremendous amount of interest
from members on both sides of the aisle. There are a number of bills
that are in the hopper, and it's providing a great amount of speculation
and interest and discussion on the part of everyone following the political scene to see what, in fact, will finally emerge from this process. But
one thing is for certain, and that is that there is a lot of discussion going
on at this time.
The analogy was made earlier to soap commercials and to packaging politicians and their election campaigns in the same way that soap
in fact is sold. I guess I would draw a couple of analogies from that. If
a soap commercial, A la political style had been run back in 1970 in
California, it probably would have sounded something like this: Brand
X is a terrific soap. It's made from some of California's best natural
products. From the beaches in their splendor to the deep and rich sequoia forests, to the majestic peaks of its grand Sierras, Brand X is the
best. Brand X is a soap you can rely on, a dependable soap, a soap that
you want for you.
Now if you ran the 1982 version of that, d la political style, it
would probably sound something like this: After a long day of athletic
competition, you're hot and tired and ready for a great bath. But
should you choose Brand Y? Think about it. Do you want a big purple rash on your body? Do you want to smell bad? Who needs Brand
Y?
Well, that's obviously an exaggeration, but I think it does say
something about what a lot of people are concerned about right now in
the political process, and that is what we call negative advertising or
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"hit pieces." Instead of the popular image of the politician walking
along the beach with his coat thrown over the shoulder, the sunset in
the background, and beautiful music playing, it has become a situation
in which rather than promoting yourself, you try to figure out a way to
attack your opponent. A lot of political consultants and campaign
managers seem to be advising their clients, their politician clients, that
this is the way to get elected in California.
Out of this seemingly great increase in negative advertising has
come a lot of interest in controlling it and turning things back to a more
positive tide. In connection with public financing, one of the new
things that we're seeing is the proposed inclusion of provisions dealing
with the content of political literature and political mailings. One way
in which this is done, for example, is to insert provisions which say that
if you want public financing money, you're going to have to agree to
certain types of restrictions in the way in which you handle your political literature. For example, a campaign ethics agreement that says
that you won't say and do certain types of things. Another type of provision is one that requires a candidate to turn the content of his mailings or literature over to his opponent a certain amount of time, such as
twenty-four, forty-eight or seventy-two hours, in advance of its release
to the public so that that person then has an opportunity to see what is
about to be said about them and possibly to respond. Again, one of the
concerns that relates to the negative hit pieces is that in many cases
they tend to arrive in the voters' mailboxes on Saturday or Monday
before the election, and as a result the opponent who is the subject of
these pieces at that point is unable to mount any kind of a response to
that type of literature. So as a new first, a lot of people are interested in
addressing this type of concern in public financing bills, and it may be
something that people want to think about and comment on as you talk
about legislation that may ultimately emerge.
There are obviously constitutional questions that are raised in connection with these kind of restrictions. On the one hand, the courts
have been generally unenthusiastic about prior restraint and very protective of the content of political speech. On the other hand, certain
types of restrictions that would otherwise not be allowed have been
permitted when they are joined with public financing. Another way of
looking at this type of restriction is that it doesn't actually restrict the
content of the speech. It only restricts the procedure by which you go
about communicating the speech to the voters. There may be a possible distinction for the courts in that type of situation.
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At any rate, at this time I'd like to turn it over to Bob Stern, General Counsel for the Fair Political Practices Commission, who also has
some observations on public financing legislation.
MR. STERN: I'd like to spend a couple of minutes and point out
some of the interesting provisions that are in some new bills that
haven't been discussed yet.
Some of these bills deal with the wealthy candidate problem. The
Buckley case said you cannot limit how much a candidate can put into
his own campaign unless there is public financing. Some of the limitations bills require the wealthy candidate to give advance notice that he
is going to put in $50,000 or $100,000. If the wealthy candidate tells the
opponents forty-five days before the election, the limitations are removed for the opponents.
Another provision limits contributions to $10,000 in the last ten
days before the election. Another bill deals with a question that was
raised before, honoraria, and limits how much honoraria can be received by legislators. Another one deals with limitations on credit, saying you can't receive credit of more than $250 before the election.
Another bill deals with off year contributions. In 1981 we had the
legislators raising twelve million dollars in off year money. One observer said that the legislators who did this were rounding the first bend
of the horserace before their challengers even got to the starting gate.
The challengers just don't raise money in the off year. Only the incumbents do.
Another bill deals with the candidates' ballot pamphlet. You get
the ballot pamphlet for ballot measures but you don't get one for candidates. This bill would allow candidates to insert things into the ballot
pamphlet on the state level.
Bills differ as to the role of the Fair Political Practices Commission. Some bills say that we should issue regulations and opinions.
Other bills say that nobody should issue regulations and opinions, and
leave it up to the candidates to decide what the bills mean. Some bills
have felony provisions, which in my view will never be enforced because D.A.s, frankly, are too busy prosecuting murders and robberies
and really don't get into the white collar crimes. Other bills provide for
administrative remedies which, at least in the experience of the Political Reform Act, is the only realistic way of enforcing these laws.
Some bills ban transfers from one candidate to another, the
Speaker of the Assembly being the best example of a person who transferred well over $100,000 to several candidates. Now the interesting
thing is that the Republicans are the only ones who are introducing the
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bills on transfers because the Republicans use the Republican Party
while the Democrats use the officeholders. Our statistics show that in
1982, on the average, the Democratic candidates in the assembly received nineteen percent in transfers, Republican candidates only five
percent.
So these are some of the bill provisions that will be debated. The
bottom line really is: will something pass? I'm very skeptical about
that. Some people say it's going to take a scandal in Sacramento before
we have any more reform, and we haven't had a scandal in Sacramento. The disclosure is there. People are seeing what is being disclosed. Other people say that we haven't had a particular scandal but
the system itself is scandalous and that's why something will pass. I
think perhaps it may take an initiative or the threat of an initiative
before something will pass the legislature, the Political Reform Act of
1974 being a good example. It was only when an initiative was being
circulated on the street that the legislature passed a very good campaign disclosure bill and a conffict of interest bill. Had the legislature
passed a lobbyist bill in 1973, there would have been no Political Reform Act because the people who circulated the initiative would have
dropped out. I think the legislature has learned from some of the recent intiatives that have gone through that an initiative can be far
worse than a bill they might come up with. So perhaps that will be the
way that something will pass. The next couple of years are going to be
interesting, and I hope you all watch what goes on in Sacramento.
MR. FAY: Thank you, Bob.
Natalie?
MR. WEST: The most interesting thing about being last is that I
have lots of things to say which don't hang together very well, but I am
going to focus my remarks primarily on ballot measure campaigns
which haven't been addressed by any of the other speakers. This is an
extremely interesting group before you today. It's been fun for me to
listen to them. To the extent that my experience is a little bit different,
I can offer a slightly different perspective. My role since 1975 has been
to actually litigate most of the major campaign law cases in California.
I've had the responsibility of losing all the cases that have struck down
various laws as violating certain constitutional rights.
When the Political Reform Act was first passed in 1974, it did contain expenditure limitations for ballot measure campaigns. Those were
passed because of the very strong view that large amounts of money in
ballot measure campaigns skew the outcome. Since then, the data has
sustained that view, especially when substantial economic interests
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spend money against an initiative measure. We've seen it recently with
the smoking and non-smoking measures where all that was sought was
to establish smoking and non-smoking sections in restaurants and the
like, and the tobacco companies spent millions of dollars in opposition
to the measure and were successful in defeating it. We've seen it with
some of the other kinds of consumer legislation, such as the returnable
bottle bill, when the legislature failed to act. Now in my remarks I'm
assuming that the initiative is a process that we want to continue to
have, and I'm well aware that any of you could debate with me for
hours about the pros and cons of the initiative. But I'll simply say that
it's well established in California and that in many instances the Political Reform Act itself is a good example of how the initiative can provide an alternative when the legislature fails to act, and that large
amounts of money pumped into the process in some instances do
thwart the will of the voters.
At any rate, to get back to ancient history, there are so few areas in
which, like election finance in the past ten years, a whole new body of
law has developed so rapidly. We were litigating expenditure limitations in the California Supreme Court at the time that the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Buckley v. Valeo. I'm referring to the case of
Citizensfor Jobs in Energy v. FairPoliticalPracticesCommission. At
that time it was our position that regulating the amount of money that
is spent in a ballot measure campaign or in any campaign is a time,
place and manner restriction analogous to limiting sound trucks on a
street in that such a regulation simply limited the volume of speech so
that other voices could be heard in the marketplace of ideas. I remember well when the Buckley decision came down because our brief in
Citizensfor Jobs in Energy was due in about three days. It was a great
couple of days there. We had the decision flown out from Washington
and as you know, it's one of the longest decisions that the Supreme
Court has ever issued. We all memorized it overnight. Then the three
or four of us who were working on the FPPC's case sat around and
talked and talked and talked. We were faced with a dilemma because
after reading and analyzing Buckley we simply could not see a distinction between the expenditure limitations that were struck down and the
expenditure limitations that we were charged with upholding under the
California law. At that point we did what I have never done in any
other case. We filed a brief for the Supreme Court which said "We had
every intention of litigating this case vigorously and we strongly believe
that the expenditure limitations serve important interests, but in light of
this decision we do not see a meaningful basis on which the state law
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can be distinguished from the limits that were struck down in Buckley."
The California Supreme Court issued a decision in which they said
"You're right. We've looked at it, too, and we don't see any way we
can distinguish these expenditure limitations." They subsequently
struck down the expenditure limitations for qualifying a measure for
the ballot in Hardie v. Eu. We did try to defend that case and identify
some different interests, but the California Supreme Court couldn't see
any realistic difference.
So there we were with the expenditure limitations eliminated and
everybody free to spend unlimited amounts of money in ballot measure
campaigns. About that time the City of Berkeley started to litigate Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley. Berkeley has its own local ordinance that regulates politics. We like to do a lot of things in a way
that's different from the way some of the other places in the state do
things. That case worked its way up through the trial court and then to
the Court of Appeal. I was then appointed the city attorney and it was
my responsibility to take over the defense of the case. At that point we
had Buckley, where the U.S. Supreme Court threw out expenditure
limitations but said you can limit the size of campaign contributions.
Then we had Bellotti, where the U.S. Supreme Court said you cannot
prohibit corporations from spending or contributing in ballot measure
campaigns. The Court reached that decision by making certain kinds
of distinctions between the nature of a ballot measure campaign and
the nature of a candidate campaign. Basically, we tried to argue that
our case was much more similar to the contribution limitation that had
been upheld in Buckley than it was to the restriction that had been
struck down in Bellotti. We argued that the infringement on protected
rights was de minimis and that people are still free to participate in the
political process. The long and the short of it is that the Supreme Court
in December of'81, in an eight to one decision, struck down the contribution limitations for ballot measure campaigns, and they did so in
very broad language. Justice Burger finally got a chance to write a
campaign law decision, and since in Buckley he'd been one of the Justices who didn't even like campaign disclosure, you can imagine that in
Citizens Against Rent Control he used some very broad language in
striking down our local ordinance. Justice White, whose dissenting
opinions in these various constitutional cases I have a lot of respect for,
gave a short but, I think, good dissent in which he argued that there
was a relatively minor infringement on protected rights and there are
very substantial interests that support that infringement.
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Well, where we are now is that there are some true believers and I wish Dan Lowenstein were here today because he is really a true
believer - who still believe that with a properly crafted contribution
limitation we could have state legislation limiting the size of contributions to ballot measure campaigns. I think that's an interesting argument and I think it might possibly fly if you made the limits so high
that it becomesSPEAKER: Meaningless.
MS. WEST: Well, I don't think meaningless, but high enough that
you can't just simply say that you're talking about protected rights. I
would support one that was up at about 200 or 250 thousand dollars
and simply say nobody can give more than 200 or 250 thousand dollars
to a campaign committee. I think that what that does is push off the
economic vested interests and require them to spend their money directly so that you know that it's whatever tobacco company instead of
Californians for Common Sense. But I think that in general what we
have to look for in ballot measure campaigns is simply vigorous enforcement of the disclosure laws. I think the FPPC has played a very
important role in this area because they put together campaign spending reports which are released to the press in advance of the election.
The press has done a good job at summarizing the sources of campaign
money to try to educate the public on where the funds originate. One
of my concerns in the political picture is that several years ago the
courts held unconstitutional the elections code provision which required campaign literature to include the name of the sponsor, and the
legislature has not yet replaced that elections code provision. Although
most people do do it, there is no legal requirement in California that
campaign literature state its source. I think it would be relatively easy
to draft a narrow bill, and this is a little project for you on Monday.
SPEAKER: It's already happening.
MS. WEST: It is?
SPEAKER: Yes.
MS. WEST: Another provision that we have in our local ordinance which is interesting provides for compilation of a list of those
persons who give more than $50 in a local election campaign. The list
is released and printed in local newspapers the week before an election.
It comes out in small print, but it's still very interesting to see who gave
what to whom. So to sum it up, I think disclosure is the best thing that
we have at this point in time in the ballot measure area.
I also want to comment on the various ethics provisions that are
getting linked up with the public financing laws. I think those are in-
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teresting, and I certainly get as discouraged as anybody at some of the
misleading stuff that gets put out. But I hope I don't have to go to court
to defend any of those provisions because I think it's going to be almost
impossible to write anything that will meet the standards that the courts
set out in Wilson v. Superior Court and some of the other cases that
allow you to actually look at the content of campaign communication.
MR. FAY: Thanks, Natalie.
I'd like to thank our panelists for their fascinating, wide ranging
views on the evolution of the political finance process over the past
decade. I guess one of the roles of moderator is to try to create some
ferment. I'm not quite sure I need to do that with this panel. Nonetheless, let me pose some questions. I'm reminded of the great French
chef who, after laboring for two days over a particular favorite dish,
was asked: "How does it taste?" Well, how does political reform taste?
What difference has a decade worth of political reform made in the
political process? Is politics different now than it was ten years ago? If
different, has it been improved? Two particular areas: Has policy been
altered by all this political reform legislation? Are we getting different
types of individuals elected to office as a result of campaign finance
legislation? Or does it just make us feel good, in which case maybe we
should simply lower the tax on brandy and we can do it at a somewhat
lower price.
Let me throw that out to the panelists. Let's start with Herb since
Herb has just finished a reader on election financing in seventeen states
and perhaps has a good perspective of what's going on around the
country in this area.
MR. ALEXANDER: Let me say first that I think the major impact
of these laws, apart from improving disclosure, has been to shift the
burden from the large contributor to the large fundraiser. Look at contribution limits at the federal level: today a Clement Stone or a Stewart
Mott can no longer contribute hundreds of thousands of dollars. On
the other hand, the $1000 contribution limit today is very low and it
has forced candidates to seek to broaden their financial bases. In the
process of doing so, however, there are a limited number of ways in
which financial sources, can be summoned. I think that what we have
developed in effect are new elites to replace the old elites who were the
fat cats. We now have people who can do direct mail, who become
very important, people like Richard Viguerie, or here in California,
Parker. We have placed great emphasis on fundraising events, and the
people who can organize those events in order to bring in sufficient
money have become terribly important actors in the political process.
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The solicitor who previously might himself have given $50,000 but today can go the country club and ask fifty friends to give $1000 each has

become a very important actor. What is misunderstood about political
action committees is that as much as anything else PACs are organized
solicitation systems by which groups of like minded people are asked to
contribute small sums which then are aggregated into larger contributions made to favored candidates. So you must understand that the
contribution limit at the federal level has accelerated the growth of
PACs. It's not that there weren't PACs before; there were. It's not that
PACs would not have developed. They would have because Congress

changed the law relating to separate segregated funds in 1971, and
again in 1974, and then again following the Buckley case in 1976. But
PACs have filled this vacuum, and if you conceptualize PACs as organ-

ized solicitation systems in a new environment in which common occupations and common ideologies have replaced neighborhood politics
which the parties used to carry on, then I think you can see why the
PACs have developed as they have and have become such important
actors.
There are seventeen states which have public funding of various
kinds. However, in about half of those states the money goes to the
political parties and does not go directly to candidates. In those states
there's been a good deal of experimentation. There's also been a great
lack of uniformity. In fact, four of the states have add ons, now five,
including California, rather than check offs, whereby people can add
one dollar or five dollars to their tax return, and designate the party to
which the money goes, with the result that the tax system is now being
utilized as a collection agency for politics in those states. However, the
returns where the add ons are available are very small, often less than
one or two percent. However, in those states where there are check offs
and the money has to be paid by the taxpayer in any case but is merely
diverted by means of the check off to a special fund which then gets
allocated to candidates or parties, the average check offs may run as
high as fifteen, twenty, or even forty percent.
I have always favored public funding on a limited basis. However,
I have been very disturbed by the expenditure limitations which have
gone with public funding. I have always favored floors not ceilings. I
have always said that it is important to help candidates reach potential
voters. But the real problem is the expenditure limitations. With expenditure limitations the American system is so full of openings, and
now of course the Supreme Court has sanctioned independent expenditures. As a result, if you tie public funding to expenditure limits you're
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bound to increase the potential for independent expenditures. Independent expenditures are by their very nature unaccountable in the
sense that the candidate can play no role in their operation. Consequently, you have an anomolous situation in which the courts play an
important role in defining independent expenditures but nevertheless
wreak havoc with some of the concepts in political finance regulation
which are essentially good.
I predict that the add on which we now have in California will be
used very little. Mr. Lockyer can talk about it, but as I said before, the
experience in other states has been that it is used very little. Here in
California, the legislature saw fit for some reason not to accompany
that add on with the ability to claim a tax deduction. As a result, individuals who give directly to candidates or give directly to parties can
claim a tax deduction under California tax law but those who give
through the add on cannot.
PROF. EPSTEIN: Let me pick up a point here. Herb properly
indicated that PACs are basically redistributive mechanisms. They
raise monies from large numbers of people, centralize it, and then managers or small committees reallocate that money to favored candidates.
So in that sense one could say that they facilitate democratic processes
and political participation. But I think this understates what really
takes place because the institutions in our society that are most favored
in terms of being able to use this system are those that have a strong
identification with significant economic interest groups such as business, labor, and trade associations. Business and labor can, and, indeed, do under the federal rules what no one else can do, and that is
use their organizational resources to establish and administer these
funds. By way of contrast, if all of us here decide that we will have the
Hastings PAC for Federal Good Government, basically we will have to
generate our own monies to start up and run this thing. We don't have
any built in advantage. It's no accident that the leading PAC contributors are realtors, AMA, UAW, Machinists, National Education Association, bankers, National Association of Homebuilders. They all have a
legitimate interest in the public policy process. But the notion that this
PAC redistribution is just another step in American pluralism - that
all of us can jump into the arena just as well favored and make our
views known and be able to be as well counted among those who are
running for office - just doesn't wash.

Another thing that I don't think has beem mentioned is that those
who run key PACs have become part of this new elite that serves a very
important role by way of perhaps screening potential candidates. In
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fact, I would say that it's in the selection of candidates rather than the
election of candidates that perhaps the PAC role is more important.
It's no secret that the RNC and the DNC trot out potential candidates
and have them dip their toes before various key PAC directors to test
their acceptability. Are these people going to be able to attract money?
I think that this role, at least to my mind, raises some questions in
terms of the democratic process.
I'd also like to express a bit of skepticism, and address a question, I
guess, to my copanelist here. For years I have felt that disclosure is
absolutely essential, absolutely important. Brandeis pointed out that
it's the white light that purifies the process. But of late I've SEN. LOCKYER: Was he giving or taking money? I forget
which.
PROF. EPSTEIN: Brandeis?
SEN. LOCKYER: Yes.
PROF. EPSTEIN: Well, I think he had a role in both, actually.
But I've had a question or a nagging doubt these last few years:
does it really make a difference? Does the public really care? I don't
know of any studies, Herb, that political scientists or communications
experts have done to really explore how the electorate is impacted
when it learns that Candidate X is receiving money from thus and so
interest ten days before the election. Does it affect their voting behavior? I don't know. I'm not suggesting that we not have disclosure. I
don't want to go back to that. But I have become more and more skeptical about whether it really has the prophylactic effect that we attribute
to it.
SEN. LOCKYER: As a politican, I would say that it is almost
universally believed that a significant number of voters do care about
that.
PROF. EPSTEIN: I see.
SEN. LOCKYER: People have become very artful about taking
certain money very late in order to minimize the possibility of opponents finding out about it in time to mount an effective campaign focused on that issue. So if political practices mean anything, it does
seem to be perceived as somehow affecting votes.
PROF. EPSTEIN: By the candidates if not the voters.
SEN. LOCKYER: Yes.
MR. FAY: Professor Forrester.
PROF. FORRESTER: I'd like to say one thing, briefly, about
public financing. There appears to be a great deal of activity in the
area. But I think a recently decided Supreme Court case, Common

490

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 10:463

Cause v. Schmidt, will have a strong negative impact on the feasibility
of public financing. In that case, a three judge District Court considered the constitutionality of that provision of the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act of 1976 which limited independent expenditures
by PACs on behalf of candidates receiving public financing to $1,000.
One of the ideas, of course, was to solve some of these problems which
have been mentioned here, including the subservience of politicians to
special interest groups and so on. The court decided that this law violated the First Amendment because it limited the freedom to speak,
through money, of the independent organizations such as PACs, and
that a candidate could not limit them in relation to their freedom of
speech by his own agreement under the provisions of the law. The
Supreme Court affirmed without comment. Now it seems to me that
the effect of this decision will be to minimize the significance of public
financing, at least in relation to some of the primary objectives of reform, such as cutting down on the total cost of campaigns, reducing the
influence of other groups on the candidate, and so on, each of which is
an objective accepted by the Supreme Court. It represents a constitutional obstacle to the feasibility of public financing. While public financing will certainly add to the financial resources of the candidate,
I'm beginning to be very dubious about what the public's going to get
out of it.
MR. FAY: Let me take a few minutes to throw things open to the
audience. Are there any questions which you'd like to direct to the
panel?
SPEAKER IN AUDIENCE: I share with Professor Forrester a
strong fear of the abuse of the political process by political action committees. I didn't live in California during the 1980 elections, but in the
locality where I did live we had the NCPAC, who I like to call "nitwits," come in and campaign aginst various Congressional candidates.
I don't know exactly where their money came from, but it appeared as
if they had gathered money from around the country and were using it
to defeat a "hit list" of various liberal candidates they didn't care for.
They started badmouthing one of the candidates and hitting on particular issues, arguing "basic American values" of family, school prayer,
anti-abortionMR. FAY: Are you suggesting legislation to prohibit contributions from out of state?
SPEAKER: Not necessarily, but I'd like to know, perhaps from
Professor Alexander or Mr. Bagatelos, what they would propose to allay the fears of people who see these groups raise large sums of money
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in various jurisdictions and then use that money to try to control or
have a strong impact on elections in other localities.
MR. ALEXANDER: Let me just make one short comment and
then turn it over to Peter.
I don't think that all political action committees should be tarred
with the activities of NCPAC, and some of the ideological PACs which
have engaged in independent expenditures. The fact is that most PACs
do not engage in independent expenditures. Most PACs do not wish to
get engaged in independent expenditures but there are always a few
rotten apples in the barrel. In my remarks earlier I did mention the
problem of accountability with respect to independent expenditures,
but that accountability is one that is very hard to implement by any
kind of regulation, and perhaps can be achieved only by voter acceptance or rejection of the views such expenditures seek to express. I
heard a very moving talk by Senator Sarbanes of Maryland, with respect to independent expenditures, in which he said, "NCPAC came
into my state long before I even had a Republican opponent, long
before the voters had been offered another choice." He said, "If my
opponent speaks ill of me, at least the voters have a choice in November. But here was this group coming from out of state, not giving
money to engage me in a dialogue, and leaving my opponent out in the
cold." That tactic worked, to a large extent, for NCPAC in 1980. It did
not work well for them in 1982. I'm just hopeful that the American
people are wise enough to detect the problems with that kind of attack.
I'm also very upset with the semantics, the militaristic terms like "hit
list", "point people" and all the rest because it is really disturbing to
hear them used in a democratic political process.
MR. BAGATELOS: I think Professor Alexander hit the key
phrase here: "Is the public wise enough to decide the issue?" Your
question seems to be based on a premise that there's something inherently wrong with a group that can go across the country or from outside
an area and politic. That's guaranteed by our constitution. You have
the right of free speech. You can say things about people. We have a
free press that reports those things. NCPAC's successes in the November election were dismal, and they spent a lot of money. Obviously, the
voters figured out what NCPAC was all about and decided to reject it.
That's what the whole democratic election process is about; voters
making a choice. NCPAC is required by the applicable laws, the Federal Election Campaign Act, to file reports, to disclose the source of the
money it raises and spends, where it's headquartered, its phone
number, the name of its treasurer, and so forth. People can call

492

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 10:463

NCPAC or any other organization that forms and find out what they

are and what they stand for. That information can be communicated
within a community through the press, through organizations and other
sources. I would leave it up to the voters to decide as they did with

NCPAC. Now I'm not saying there aren't going to be abuses because I
think there will be some. But society has to tolerate certain abuses,

certain offenses. The hit pieces that go out twenty-four or forty-eight
hours before an election, especially those that are extremely misleading
or use innuendo to make people draw conclusions, are very unfair. I've
thought about it, but offhand, I can't think of any real good way to deal

with it except through the press. Under the Supreme Court cases, you
can't have judges reviewing the content of campaign literature before it
goes out because that's prior restraint. I think the various campaigns
have to be organized and smart enough to address those concerns, to

anticipate what's likely to come out and be prepared to respond with
their own message to the voters.
SEN. LOCKYER: I'd like to add two thoughts. One is that I
think there is a trap in trying to legislate constraints on PACs because
the restrictions can be evaded so easily. For instance, PACs could just
collect checks and, instead of putting them in one bank account and
issuing new ones, just distribute the individual checks to a candidate. I
think it's a fruitless exercise to try to impose such a control because it
would be so easily evaded.
The second point is that obviously there are very great difficulties
that are principally created by our Court. I'm hopeful that will change
some day. But meanwhile, I hope there may be a sensible way to increase public financing for candidates whose opponents rely on independent wealth or independent expenditures, and that a
constitutionally permissible balance can be achieved. But to my
knowledge, no one's tried it yet. Perhaps it's a possibility in the seventeen states Herb Alexander has studied.
MR. PRIM: One thing I might add to this. I don't propose a solution-I'm not even sure it's a problem-but it's something that you
may be interested in thinking about. Several years ago, the commission
did a study on California legislative races and discovered that approximately seventy-seven percent of the contributions received by state legislators came from sources which were based outside the legislator's
jurisdiction. This finding raises the issue of the source of campaign
funds and whether those sources are in some sense located or controlled from areas outside of the district. Whether or not that deserves
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any kind of consideration or whether there are any kind of controls
that can be put on that make any sense in an issue for discussion.
MR. ALEXANDER: I don't want to let that one pass without
commenting. There is talk about limiting out of state contributions or
out of district contributions. In my view, they're faulty because it's important that there be a nationalization of politics, that we get away
from the provincial notion that a legislator represents only his or her
district. The fact is that the person who's elected has to represent all of
the people. As long as campaign costs are high, candidates are going to
raise money wherever they can find it. If it's not available in the district, as it is not in most districts, they're going to go to Sacramento, to
Albany, to Washington, to Beverly Hills, to New York City, to wherever the money is available. In some states and in some districts,
there's a dominance of one industry, and it's very hard, for example,
for a Democrat to raise sufficient money without importing it from labor organizations in Washington. Take the case of a black running in
Mississippi. The black constituency cannot support a candidate for
major office, so that candidate has to go to Beverly Hills, to New York,
to the limousine liberals or whoever, to get funding. So I would urge
you to think through this kind of problem with respect to out of state
and out of district contributions. It's not as simple as saying that because certain people vote in an district only their money should be
spent in election campaigns there.
SEN. LOCKYER: I sure don't want to do reapportionment if one
of the considerations is whether I can get a certain contributor in my
district.
PROF. EPSTEIN: Two very brief comments on the point that you
raised here. First of all, I genuinely believe that in 1984 you're going to
see much less by way of negative advertising. I think that at both the
national and state levels there was somewhat of a revulsion that developed here when four out of every five ads heard were negative ones. I
really think there was public indignation about this. As Herb Alexander pointed out, Tim Dolan and NCPAC didn't do so well in 1982, and
I think they're going to have a hard time even raising money for 1984.
Also, Herb's point has another dimension to it. A number of ballot issues which I supported because of my own personal value premises lost this time around. Handgun control was not passed and the
bottle bill was not passed. But I do believe that Container Corporation
and Continental Can had a legitimate interest in that particular legislation because they would have been affected by it and that they had the
constitutional right to express themselves through their expenditures on
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that subject. While it hurts me because my issue lost, that's the way the
system functions.
MR. FAY: We have a couple more questions.
SPEAKER IN AUDIENCE: This is addressed to you, Professor
Alexander, and it's really on a somewhat minor point that you made
earlier. You said that you oppose aggregate limits on the amount of
contributions that a candidate can accept because the candidate would
therefore have to choose who he could accept money from. Assuming
that the aggregate amount is sufficient to put on a viable campaign, and
assuming also that it would serve to limit the cost of campaigns in general, I would submit that such a limitation would further the interest
which has been recognized by the Court, that is, avoiding the reality or
appearance of corruption, because a candidate would not have to accept money from every potential contributor, thereby becoming beholden to them, just to keep up with his opponent.
MR. ALEXANDER: That's a very tough question, one that recalls
a comment by Alfred Kahn, who worked in the Carter administration,
to the effect that "Anybody who isn't schizophrenic these days just isn't
thinking clearly." The fact is that many of these are very tough, difficult questions to deal with.
What I meant to say is that introducing aggregate limits on the
amount of money that congressional candidates can accept from PACs
raises constitutional questions of a different order than those raised by
either contribution or expenditure limitations, topics on which the
Supreme Court has already spoken. The proposed limits are in effect
aggregate receipt limits, and candidates would need to pick and choose
among proffered contributions to stay under the ceiling. Those who
could not contribute because the candidate's limit had been reached
could argue that their constitutional right to give would be denied,
presuming the candidate would have been willing to accept the money
had the limit not already been reached. I don't know. You people are
the lawyers, the constitutional experts, but I see the courts dealing with
this in a different way than they have dealt with either contribution
limits or expenditure limits.
SPEAKER IN AUDIENCE: Well, I express my frustration, I
suppose, and my disappointment that we can't limit expenditures to the
amount of public financing. But I live in the reality of Sacramento and
I see the reality of Washington. I'm talking about lobbyists now. The
Economic Recovery Tax Act, the great depreciation benefits, rate tax
benefits for the utilities sector, what we call "tax normalization," were
accomplished by lobbyists making contributions which allowed them
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to influence the vote of those in elected office. Lobbyists prevail in Sacramento on economic matters, in my view, against public officials and
our staffs. For example, efforts over the last four years to repeal a unitary method of applying the bank and corporation tax to the multinational corporations went through both houses almost unanimously. It
floundered because there was a dispute between the senate and the assembly in conference, and it was defeated not because of petty efforts of
public officials such as myself, but because of a controversy over ego.
Now we're supposed to view the legislative arena as the place where
economic and public interests don't compete. That's what we're paid to
perceive, correctly or not. But, while it's a rather extreme statement, I
don't think we have a democracy in Sacramento where economics are
concerned. The people are outspent, they're outvoted, they're outinfluenced, and something has to be done about it. Otherwise, ultimately
and literally, we're not a democratic society. It's no comfort to me that
the people in their ultimate wisdom will remove bad legislators.
Genghis Khan ultimately perished, but not until many, many years had
passed. We don't have that much time. Unless this situation changes,
the "third house" will forever govern the United States and the state of
California in economic matters. Look what happens when we try to
tax the railroads and the utilities. If they're offended by the tax, it's
assaulted in the judicial system and, if they don't prevail there, they
legislate the thing out of existence. They never seem to lose. If you
look at the burden of federal and state taxes, it's shifting more and
more from the corporate sector to individuals and this is the direct result of influence. Now I don't know how you do it, but somebody's got
to find an answer to that. I don't have one.
PROF. FORRESTER: Amen.
SPEAKER: Is there an answer to it?
MR. BAGATELOS: Yes, you seal the legislature into an airtight
compartment and you don't let anyone have access to them. That's the
ultimate solution.
SPEAKER: No, that's not the ultimate solution. I suggest that
men of good judgment, common sense and education can find a better
answer than that.
MR. BAGATELOS: Influence is implicit in the system, and no
matter what kind of system you set up, you're still going to have some
influence coming from some quarter.
SPEAKER: Look, that's not good enough any more. You've got
to get an answer, somebody does. If you don't have it, somebody does.
I don't.
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MR. ALEXANDER: I agree that the organized interests are the
ones that fare the best in the system. The problem is the unorganized,
the consumers, maybe the environmentalists, the young, the poor, the
deprived, the senior citizens, and so on. They are basically the real
problem with the system. As much as I have a functional analysis of
the existence of PACs, as much as I have an understanding of the high
cost of politics and the need to go to lobbyists or PACs for money, I am
still troubled by the fact that the disorganized elements do not get well
represented in the system as it exists today.
PROF. EPSTEIN: Well, Herb, that's basically the point I've been
making over the last few years.
MR. FAY: I think I'll use my prerogative as chair to call the panel
to an end. I'd like to thank the panelists for their participation here
today.
MR. ALEXANDER: I just have one little quip which deals both
with negative campaigns and it is good for lawyers. It's about one candidate who lost to another. Loser Rosco Cunningham stood up at a
post-election party rally for winner Dan Crane and said, "I hereby retract all the nasty truths I uttered about this man during the primary. I
find it easy to support Crane. After all, I was trained as a lawyer. I can
defend almost anything."

